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Abstract 
Many young working age adults in developed countries are failing to thrive in 
economic, demographic and social terms. Their failure to thrive is a relatively new 
phenomenon that has not been widely recognized, but it affects young adults in virtually 
all the more developed countries for which we have relevant data. Young adults 
nowadays are more often in poverty. They are leaving their parental homes at ever later 
ages and in some countries the frequency of psychological problems increased. The 
seriousness of failure to thrive syndrome is reflected in the relationship between relative 
economic conditions and increased suicide rates. The syndrome is important because 
young adults are at the prime ages for finding employment, establishing long-run career 
paths and building an economic basis for founding a family. Developing strategies to 
arrest the spread of failure to thrive syndrome among young adults, in order to keep 
them vibrant contributors to our societies, should be a priority for policy makers. 
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Young Adult Failure to Thrive Syndrome 
Warren C. Sanderson, Vegard Skirbekk, and Marcin Stonawski 
The period of transition from one’s family of origin to independent adult life is a crucial 
one. This is the stage at which young adults make decisions about schooling, housing, 
careers, conjugal partnerships and childbearing – decisions that will have a long-term 
effect on their wellbeing and through demographic change the fiscal sustainability of 
national economies. If they fail to thrive at this critical phase of their life cycle, their 
ability to develop to their fullest potential in later adult life could be reduced. 
In some countries this syndrome has already been recognized. In Italy, the novel 
“Generazione mille euro” gave a name to a generation and spawned a movie and a 
popular website (New York Times 2006; Incorvaia and Rimassa 2006; 
www.Generazione1000.com). The 1,000 Euro generation is composed of young people, 
many of whom are quite educated, who live on low and insecure incomes and who have 
difficulty in finding a long-term stable job. In France, this generation is known as 
“Génération précire” (Newsweek 2007). In Spain, the members of this generation are 
called “mileuristas” (Guardian 2008). In Germany, these young people belong to 
“Generation Praktikum” (Hommerich 2009). In Japan, they are known as “freeters” 
(Hommerich 2009). All over the developed world, young adults are failing to thrive. 
In each country, there are specific explanations of why the young are having 
such difficulties. We show here that these local explanations of young adult failure to 
thrive syndrome miss an essential point. The syndrome is a worldwide phenomenon that 
is evident at least from the 1980s onward. Although national characteristics certainly 
play a role in modifying its extent, they cannot explain its appearance in so many 
countries. 
In this report, we provide evidence for the failure to thrive syndrome. We begin 
in Section 1 by discussing the decline in the relative economic conditions of young 
adults. As seen in Section 2, this deterioration is reflected in increases in their suicide 
rates. Section 3 explains how life satisfaction, marriage, divorce, fertility, and health are 
all affected by changes in relative economic conditions. Section 4 discusses the relative 
decline in female subjective wellbeing and shows that it is consistent with the failure to 
thrive syndrome. The final section contains our concluding thoughts. 
1  Declining Relative Economic Conditions 
We define “young adult” in a broad sense, from around ages 15 to 40. We use this 
extended life phase because it includes most transitions to adulthood – completing an 
education, establishing a career path, finding a stable job, identifying a partner, 
establishing a stable union and becoming a parent. 
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There is no single correct measure of relative income because there a number of 
ways of measuring income and a variety of standards against which to compare it. 
Therefore, in this section, we look at relative incomes from a number of viewpoints and 
show that young adult failure to thrive syndrome shows up in all our measures. 
Young adult failure to thrive syndrome is a general phenomenon in developed 
countries. One way to see this is to consider the relative poverty of young adults. The 
OECD has computed the relative poverty rates by age for subsets of its countries 
(OECD 2008). For the average of seven countries (OECD-7), data are available for the 
mid-1970s, the mid-1980s, the mid-1990s, around 2000, and the mid-2000s. For the 
average of 23 countries (OECD-23) information is available only from the mid-1980s 
onward. Figure 1 shows the data for 26 to 40 year olds and for 51-65 year olds. Relative 
poverty is defined as an individual having a cash income less than 50 percent of the 
median cash income in the person’s country. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Relative poverty rates in selected OECD countries from the mid-1970s to the 
mid-2000s. Source: OECD (2008: 132) and http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/422163541278. 
Notes:  100 = poverty rate for the country in the indicated period. 
Relative poverty rates are ratios of age-specific poverty rates to national ones. People in poverty 
have incomes below 50 percent of the national median income. 
OECD 7 includes average of Canada, Finland, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. 
OECD 23 includes average of all OECD countries except Australia, Belgium, Iceland, the 
Republic of Korea, Poland, the Slovak Republic, and Switzerland. 
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In the mid-1970s, the relative poverty rate for the OECD-7 was 61 (national 
poverty rate = 100) for the 26-40 year olds and almost double for the 51-65 year olds. 
By the mid-2000s the relative poverty rate for the 26-40 year olds had risen to 86, while 
for the 51-65 year olds it had fallen to 78. The relative poverty rate fell dramatically for 
the 51-65 year old population, while it rose considerably for the younger people. The 
pattern that we see in Figure 1, a rise in the data for the younger adults from the mid-
1970s through the mid-1990s, a leveling off, and then a continued rise in the early years 
of the 2000s, will be broadly replicated in other measures of relative income. The 
picture from the OECD-23 is basically the same. In the mid-1980s, there was more 
relative poverty among the 51 to 65 year olds than among the 26 to 40 year olds. By the 
mid-2000s, the situation was reversed (OECD 2008). 
The OECD findings on worsening relative conditions for the young are 
consistent with other findings. For example, in the US, poverty in the 1960s was higher 
among the 65+ than among the youth, but this reversed in the 1970s. By 2007 youth 
poverty rate was 18.0 percent, while poverty rates among the 18-64 year olds was 10.9 
percent (US Census Bureau 2008). It is also consistent with evidence from Statistics 
Sweden, which shows that between 1980 and 2003, the share of Swedish 20-24 year 
olds who reported having health problems increased from 7 percent to 10 percent, while 
for the 60-64 year olds the share decreased from 41 percent to 36 percent. Individuals in 
their 20s were less likely to have access to cars in 2003 than in 1980, and available 
living space decreased for the young. Between 1980 and 2003, the number of 
individuals per 100 rooms increased from 59 to 65 for 20-24 year olds, while it 
decreased from 41 to 34 for the 60-64 year olds (Vogel and Råbäck 2004). 
Young adult failure to thrive syndrome has developed differently for the two 
sexes, so it is useful to show what has happened to their relative incomes separately. 
Table 1 shows changes in percentages of 26-30 year old men and women in Belgium, 
West Germany, Italy, the UK, Canada, and the US, who have incomes above 50 percent 
of the national median adjusted income. The data cover roughly a period of a decade 
and a half from the mid-1980s to around the turn of the century. All figures are adjusted 
for family size by dividing incomes by the square root of the number of people in the 
household. 
Table 1.  Percent point change in the number of 26-30 year olds who have the indicated 
variable above 50 percent of the national median adjusted disposable income, 1994-
2000. Source: Bell et al. (2007: Tables 6 and 8). Original data: LIS (2010). 
Country Starting-
ending date 
Individual income adjusted 
for family size 
Average family income 
adjusted for family size 
  Males Females Males Females 
Belgium 1985-1997 -13  5 -8 -4 
W. Germany 1984-2000 -10 -3 -4 -6 
Italy 1987-2000 -15  9 -2 -2 
UK 1986-1995 -6 13 -1 -5 
Canada 1987-1997 -5  3 -3  0 
USA 1986-2000  1  6  0  0 
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The left two columns of Table 1 show the percentage point change based on 
individual wage and salary incomes. In five out of six countries, the change was positive 
for women and negative for men. Taken as individuals, women’s relative incomes 
improved over the period covered in the table and men’s relative incomes deteriorated. 
These are well known findings and on their face they appear to indicate that only young 
men were failing to thrive. 
The right two columns indicate what happened to the incomes of the families in 
which the young men and women were living. The percentage point change in the 
percentage of 26-30 year old men who lived in families with adjusted personal incomes 
above 50 percent of the national median adjusted personal income was negative in five 
out of the six countries and zero in the US. For females, we see decreases in four out of 
the six countries and no change in the other two. When we consider men and women in 
family units, rather than as individuals, we see that both experienced declines in their 
joint economic resources even taking household economies of scale into account. The 
deterioration in the economic conditions of young men more than outweighed the 
improvement for young women. 
In Table 2, we focus on the relative economic conditions of young men in 14 
developed countries and in Taiwan. We present ratios of the median earnings of 25-34 
year old men to the median earnings of 45-54 year old men. The medians are computed 
only over those with earnings. We have gathered data from surveys in the 1980s, 1990s, 
and early 2000s. In 13 of the observations the ratio of median earnings of the younger to 
older men decreased from the 1980s to the early 2000s, indicating a long-run 
deterioration in the relative economic condition of young men. This deterioration was 
not monotonic. In a number of places, there was some improvement in the relative 
economic conditions of young men from the 1990s to the early 2000s. 
 
Table 2.  Median real gross or net earnings for 25-34 and 45-54 year old men and their 
ratio from the 1980s through the early 2000s. Sources: LIS (2010); OECD (2007). 
Earnings Country Year 
25-34 45-54 
Wage Ratio 
1980s 100 100 99 
1990s 100 109 87 Australia** 
early 2000s 111 126 91 
1980s 100 100 85 
1990s 107 113 80 Belgium* 
early 2000s 122 127 82 
1980s 100 100 83 
1990s 86 100 72 Canada 
early 2000s 90 101 74 
1980s 100 100 93 
1990s 96 103 87 Denmark 
early 2000s 100 108 87 
1980s 100 100 86 
1990s 102 107 83 Finland 
early 2000s 124 120 89 
 5
1980s 100 100 85 
1990s 93 105 75 France* 
early 2000s 92 103 75 
1980s 100 100 93 
1990s 93 106 81 Italy* 
early 2000s 92 106 80 
1980s 100 100 87 
1990s 126 153 73 Luxembourg* 
early 2000s 140 180 68 
1980s 100 100 85 
1990s 104 113 78 Netherlands 
early 2000s 103 113 77 
1980s 100 100 91 
1990s 97 104 85 Norway 
early 2000s 115 121 87 
1980s 100 100 107 
1990s 85 117 78 Spain* 
early 2000s 94 131 77 
1980s 100 100 86 
1990s 106 110 83 Sweden 
early 2000s 131 131 86 
1980s 100 100 100 
1990s 172 196 88 Taiwan 
early 2000s 180 212 85 
1980s 100 100 95 
1990s 116 120 87 UK 
early 2000s 129 136 85 
1980s 100 100 77 
1990s 83 97 66 US 
early 2000s 88 98 70 
Notes: Average figures from surveys in the 1980s = 100. 
Wage ratio is defined as median wage for males aged 25-34 over median wage for males 
aged 45-54. 
* countries for which net income was only available. 
** data on gross income in Australia comes from OECD (2007). 
 
Easterlin (1980) suggested that the ratio of the incomes of young men to the 
expectations that they formed about what was a satisfactory lifestyle when they were 
young would be related to demographic outcomes. Unfortunately, there is not enough 
comparable economic data to create this measure of relative income both over time and 
across a wide variety of developed countries. There are, however, data for the United 
States. Macunovich (1998) provides data on the average earnings of young men in their 
first five years of work experience relative to the income of families with heads aged 
45-54 years five years earlier. For both Whites and African-Americans, relative incomes 
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fell from 1970 to the mid-1980s, rose a bit to 1990 and then fall again to the mid-1990s. 
In Figure 1 above, we saw some deterioration in the relative income of the young from 
the beginning of the 2000s to the middle of the decade. Further, the current climate of 
economic weakness in many developed countries seems likely to exacerbate the decline 
in the relative incomes of the young. In the US, the employment population ratio for 
men 25 to 29 was 89.3 percent in April of 2000 and fell by 11.4 percentage points to 
77.9 percent in April 2010. The employment population ratio for 50 to 54 year old men 
started out at 85.2 percent in April 2000, which is lower than the rate for the younger 
men. By April 2010, the rate had fallen only 6.5 percentage points to 78.7 percent and 
was then higher than the rate for the younger men. 
Economic downturns in the 1990s resulted in less hiring and staggering 
increases in unemployment among young men in particular (EU 2009). Evidence from 
the “Big 5 crises” – Spain, Sweden, Finland, Norway and Japan – shows that 
unemployment problems for men aged 15-24 may remain for years after the economy 
begins to grow again (Reinhart and Rogoff 2008; Verick 2009). For example, during the 
Swedish crisis around 1990, unemployment for men aged 25-54 rose from 1.1 percent 
to 9.3 percent, while unemployment among 15-24 year old men rose from 3.9 percent to 
26.1 percent. In Finland, where GDP collapsed by 14 percent from 1990 to 1993, 
unemployment grew from below 10 percent to a peak of 31.5 percent in 1994 for young 
Finnish men – twice the level experienced by the prime age group. Youth 
unemployment in Finland only slowly decreased. Even by 2008 youth unemployment 
had not reached the pre-crisis level, although GDP per capita surpassed its pre-crisis 
level in 1997 (Verick 2009). 
Cross-sectional measures of the economic conditions of the young, informative 
as they are, miss an important element. Not only has the economic situation of young 
adults worsened on average, but their economic insecurity has also increased. Economic 
insecurity is difficult to quantify and presenting the details of studies that measure them 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Farber (2007) found increasing job insecurity in the 
US. Genda (2006) in his aptly titled book, A Nagging Sense of Job Insecurity: The New 
Reality Facing Japanese Youth, found it in Japan. Mills et al. (2005) found it in 14 
countries: Germany, Netherlands, France, Sweden, Norway, Hungary, Estonia, Britain, 
Canada, the United States, Mexico, Italy, Spain, and Ireland. Studies with less age 
specificity for the US also show increases in income insecurity (Moffitt and Gottschalk 
2002; Hacker 2008; Hacker et al. 2010). 
Younger age groups have recently taken the brunt of welfare, pension and labor 
reforms. The “last in, first out” principle, advocated by many unions, worsens the 
employment stability of younger workers, while seniors are more sheltered from 
economic fluctuations (Oswald 1987). Decreasing incomes and increasing economic 
insecurity at younger ages are likely to have long term effects. Those who suffer 
relatively low wages at younger ages are likely to be “scarred” for life, implying that 
their risk of unemployment and their wage levels will be lower at higher ages than 
cohorts who experienced less difficult labor market conditions in their youth 
(Arulampalam et al. 2000; Gregg and Tominey 2005). Evidence from surveys reveals 
that key prerequisites for family formation and childbearing are a sufficiently high 
income, reasonable housing and even more importantly: stable employment with longer 
term prospects (Andersson 2000; Koytcheva and Philipov 2008; Kravdal 1999). The 
young may choose to postpone or not enter parenthood altogether if their income is too 
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low. Age-earnings curves that peak late in life can make family formation difficult, and 
the slope of earnings curves are associated with postponed fertility (Van Bavel 2010). 
Not only have the relative incomes of young adults tended to decrease, so have their 
relative wealth (Jappelli and Pistaferri 2000; Haffner 2004; Klevmarken 2006). 
In this section, we have presented evidence from a wide variety of sources. They 
all tell a consistent story: The economic conditions in which young adults find 
themselves have gotten more difficult, affecting their ability to thrive. 
2  Suicide 
One of the most striking indicators of the young adult failure to thrive syndrome is the 
negative correlation between changes in the wage ratios for young adult men and 
changes in their suicide rates. This is shown in Figure 2. The data are for the three 
periods and cover the 14 countries in Table 2. The correlation between changes in the 
wage ratios and suicide rates is -0.7. Without the two outliers, Luxembourg 80s-90s, 
and Spain 80s-90s, the correlation is -0.57. Both correlations are statistically 
significantly different from zero (95 percent confidence). 
All the indicators of young adult failure to thrive syndrome are imperfect to 
some degree. This is also the case for suicide rates. We need to be cautious about how 
we treat the extent of decline from 1985-89 to 2000-04. It is possible that some of the 
decline in suicide rates in that period was due to the introduction of more effective 
medications for treating schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder and to stronger 
anti-suicide programs that were put in place in the late 1980s and early 1990s because 
of substantial increases in suicide rates that had recently occurred. 
The worsening economic conditions of young men alone do not, by themselves, 
provide strong evidence for the failure to thrive hypothesis. In theory, it is possible that 
the deteriorating relative economic conditions of the young men were, for the most part, 
something that was chosen by them. This argument starts from the idea that the young 
men wanted a period of prolonged experimentation in which they were “finding 
themselves.” In this period of experimentation, it could be argued that the young desired 
the freedom to find a career path in a more leisurely manner. If this argument were true 
it would be hard to understand why having voluntarily chosen worse relative economic 
conditions, young men would have chosen to commit suicide more often. 
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Figure 2.  Relative changes in the wage ratio and relative changes in the suicide rate of 
men ages 25-34. Sources: Data on earnings: OECD (2007); LIS (2010). Data on suicide: 
WHO (2010). 
Notes: Countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and United States. 
Wage ratio is in Table 2. 
 
Relative change in the wage ratio is . 
 
 
Relative change in the suicide rate is . 
 
Correlation without the two outliers – Luxembourg 80s-90s; Spain 80s-90s – is -0.57 and is also 
statistically significant (at the 95 percent level – p-value=0.0022). 
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3  Relative Incomes and Demographic Behavior 
In this section, we look at cross-sectional studies that relate relative incomes and 
demographic behavior. Relative wages have been found to be strongly related to an 
individual’s well-being and to matter more than absolute income levels (Clark and 
Oswald 1996; Grund and Sliwka 2003). 
In Section 2, we showed that in a group of developed countries changes in the 
suicide rates of young men were negatively correlated over time with changes in their 
relative incomes. A recent cross-sectional study based on county-level data from the US 
(Daly et al. 2010) finds a robust correlation between relative incomes and suicide rates 
for adults 20-64. The incomes that were used are predicted family incomes based on the 
characteristics of individuals. They were measured relative to county-level family 
incomes. This cross-section confirmation of our time series results is important because 
in the time series results, we could not control for the effects of increased use of 
psychotropic medications. So even though the Daly et al. (2010) study does not focus 
on young men, its consistency with our time series results strengthens our confidence in 
them. 
Among young adult males, generally those with lower incomes are less likely to 
be married than those with higher incomes. Watson and McLanahan (2009), using US 
data, find that the relative income of young men is an important determinant of whether 
or not they are married. Men with higher relative incomes were more likely to be 
married. This effect is consistent with the international data on headship rates in Bell et 
al. (2007: Table 1). 
Surveys from several industrialized countries suggest that women perceive their 
partner’s income to be more important than their own wages when it comes to family 
formation. The Japanese National Survey on Work and Family (2007) shows that as a 
precondition for marrying for those aged 25-34, the partner’s income level is “not very 
important” or “not important at all” for 69 percent of the men, but only among 5 percent 
of the women. Even in Norway, which had one of the world’s highest female labor 
force participation rates (79 percent in 2008), a 2008 survey finds that 7 out of 10 
women prefer that the man is the main breadwinner of the family (NRK 2008; OECD 
2010). Liu and Vikat (2004) studied the effects of differences in the ratio of husband’s 
to wife’s earnings in Sweden. They found that the higher that ratio, the lower the 
probability of divorce. The role of relative income in affecting demographic variables 
was introduced by Easterlin (1966). A survey of the tests of the relationship between 
relative income and fertility (Macunovich 1998) found that most of the studies were 
consistent with Easterlin’s view that the relative income of young men influenced 
fertility. 
Relative income also affects mortality and morbidity. Eibner and Evans (2005) 
combine a number of US datasets to analyze the effects of what they call relative 
deprivation on both deaths and disease prevalence and health habits. They found that 
there is a positive and statistically significant association between their measure of 
relative deprivation and the person dying within the subsequent five years (p. 615). A 
register based study of 1.68 million men and women in Norway (Elstad et al. 2006) 
found that income relative to that in the surrounding residential area was negatively 
related to mortality risk for people with low absolute incomes living in places with 
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20,000 or more inhabitants. For people with high absolute income, there was no effect 
of relative income. 
Changes in relative economic circumstances have many consequences, but they 
are not the main causes of many of them. For example, mortality and morbidity are 
affected by relative economic conditions and many other factors as well. Government 
policies can affect relative economic conditions and their resulting effects. 
4  Failure to Thrive Syndrome and the Subjective Wellbeing of 
Women 
Failure to thrive syndrome manifests itself differently among young men and young 
women. Indeed, it seems a bit odd to even raise the possibility of a failure to thrive 
syndrome among young women. The last decades seem to have been a golden age for 
them. Their labor force participation rates rose dramatically and in many developed 
countries are almost as high as for men. Wage rates for young women, although still 
below those of young men, have risen. The proportion of young women in colleges now 
exceeds the proportion of young men, and young women now make up an ever 
increasing share of young professionals. It is, therefore, quite paradoxical that measures 
of subjective well-being show that the happiness of women in the US has declined both 
absolutely and relative to that of men (Stevenson and Wolfers 2009). The decline in the 
happiness for women is substantial. It would be roughly equivalent to the welfare loss 
from the unemployment rate rising for 4.5 percent to 12.5 percent. In Europe, the 
happiness of women has tended to increase over time, but still fell relative to men 
(Stevenson and Wolfers 2009). 
Stevenson and Wolfers study relative happiness in a number of domains and find 
that none fully explains the decrease in the relative happiness of women. The financial 
domain, however, matters more than most. At the beginning of the US data, men and 
women were about equally satisfied with their household’s financial position. By the 
end of the period, women were substantially less satisfied than men. It is also interesting 
that both men and women have become less happy with their marriages over time. Since 
the happiness of men and women with their marriages declined at about the same rate, 
this factor cannot account for the decrease in the relative happiness of women, but it 
could be a factor in decreasing proportions of young people married. 
Young adult failure to thrive syndrome manifests itself differently for men and 
women. For men, their lower relative incomes and less secure job prospects have 
reduced their role as the prime breadwinner in families and reduced their value in the 
marriage market. For families, the lack of stable support by men has been compensated 
in part by the increased earnings of women. This is exactly what we saw in Table 1. 
For women, the situation is different. Earlier they lived in families where their 
spouses had more stable and relatively better paying jobs. As opportunities for women 
expanded and the relative economic conditions of their spouses deteriorated, women 
began to contribute ever larger shares of family incomes. Thus, women were affected in 
two ways. First, the likelihood of stable family support from spouses diminished, and 
second, they became more tied to an increasingly uncertain set of labor market 
conditions. Thus, while women buffered the deterioration in the relative economic 
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conditions faced by men, they did this by becoming more vulnerable to those conditions 
themselves. 
It is not the case that women are thriving and men are suffering. Young men and 
women typically live together. The declining economic circumstances of young families 
(as we showed in Table 1) prove that young adult failure to thrive syndrome affects both 
sexes. 
5  Discussion 
In describing young adult failure to thrive syndrome, we started by discussing the 
deteriorating economic conditions faced by young adults. This was motivated by the 
fact that young adult failure to thrive syndrome is an international phenomenon. It has 
similar characteristics in many countries. Therefore, no explanation based on the 
particular situation in a given country would be complete. Another factor argued in 
favor of this ordering as well. Relative incomes of young men worsened from the 1980s 
to the 1990s and then slightly improved in the early 2000s. We see a similar dynamic in 
the suicide rates of young people. 
Thus it appears that deteriorating economic conditions played an important role 
in failure to thrive syndrome, but we are not arguing that it played the only role. 
Economic conditions, suicide rates, demographic changes, and the lengthening period of 
emerging adulthood are all interconnected in a complex web. All young adults are not 
equally susceptible to the failure to thrive syndrome. It is most prevalent among those 
with the least education (Danziger and Ratner 2010). They are becoming ever more 
marginalized in today’s developed countries. But failure to thrive syndrome is hardly 
limited to those with the least education. 
A full discussion of the possible causes of this syndrome is beyond the scope of 
this paper. The fact that it can be observed in so many countries, however, suggests that 
there are common elements involved. Some aspects of increasing globalization may be 
at work here. It may also be the case that the political power of older generations has 
increased. The two of these may even have interacted with labor market liberalizations 
in response to globalization differentially hurting the young. Neither the effects of 
globalization nor the political power of older generations is likely to diminish in the 
near-term future. 
Many developed countries are now spending large amounts of money in order to 
stimulate couples to have more children. Studies suggest that these efforts, thus far, 
have had some, although not much, effect (Gauthier 2007; Grant et al. 2004). The 
policies are usually designed to lower the cost of children to couples. But to the extent 
that young adult failure to thrive syndrome makes it difficult to form a partnership with 
enough financial resources and stability to support childbearing, then it is not surprising 
that the policies have had only modest success. A recognition of young adult failure to 
thrive syndrome suggests that certain reforms such as enabling young adults to easily 
enter and remain in the labor market (Bovenberg 2008) could have positive effects on 
fertility. Also institutional changes that allow for more efficient schooling and an earlier 
graduation without lowering human capital levels can extend the length of the working 
life and provide more opportunities for childbearing (Lutz and Skirbekk 2005). 
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While our attention has been focused on what appears to be critical matters with 
respect to increasing labor market flexibility and with respect to making pension and 
healthcare systems sustainable, we have been ignoring another equally important 
problem, the economic well-being of the young. If we try to solve our labor market and 
fiscal problems at the expense of the young, we might find that we cannot solve them at 
all. True solutions to the economic problems associated with globalization and aging 
must take into account the well-being of all members of society, not just the old. 
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